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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Dwayne Joseph Farr pied guilty to one count of 
felony domestic battery. He received a unified sentence of eight years, with three years 
fixed. Although the district court initially retained jurisdiction, following Mr. Farr's "rider," 
it ultimately relinquished jurisdiction. 
On appeal, Mr. Farr argues that the district court acted in manifest disregard of 
the pertinent provisions of I.C.R. 32 and the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, when it 
failed to sua sponte order a mental health evaluation of Mr. Farr prior to sentencing. 
Mr. Farr also contends that the district court erred when it relinquished its retained 
jurisdiction. He further contends the district court abused its discretion in failing to 
reduce his sentence in light of Mr. Farr's mental health issues and other mitigating 
factors as well as the additional information submitted in conjunction with his Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On the morning of October 28, 2011, law enforcement officials responded to a 
report that Mr. Farr and his wife had an altercation. (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), 1 p.3.) Mr. Farr was intoxicated and had become physically violent 
with his wife, Gena Farr. (PSI, p.3.) As Ms. Farr was leaving the residence, he 
threatened her with a kitchen knife. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Farr was charged by Information 
with one count of felony domestic battery, one count of attempted strangulation of a 
1 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file containing 
the APSI, the PSI, and all included attachments. These documents will hereinafter be 
described as the "PSI" for ease of reference. 
1 
household member, and one count of aggravated assault with a weapons 
enhancement. (R., pp.53-55.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Farr pied guilty to the felony domestic battery 
charge and the other charges were dismissed. (12/21/11 Tr., p.7, L.17 - p.8, L.20, 
p.10, Ls.5-8, p.11, L.24 - p.12, L.5; R., pp.47, 49-52, 59-60.) Although the terms of the 
plea agreement provided that the State agreed to recommend probation and local jail, 
the plea agreement also contained a provision which required Mr. Farr to abide by Court 
orders and the conditions of his release. (12/21/11 Tr., p.15, Ls.10-16; R., pp.4, 49-
527.) If he failed to do so, the State would no longer be bound to recommend probation 
and only local jail. (12/21/11 Tr., p.15, Ls.12-16.) Further, a no contact order was 
entered which prohibited Mr. Farr from contacting the victim in the domestic battery 
case, Gena Farr. (R., pp.37, 40.) Compliance with the no contact order was one term 
and condition of Mr. Farr's release from custody. (12/21/11 Tr., p.14, L.19-p.15, L.18.) 
The district court ordered a substance abuse evaluation2 and a domestic violence 
evaluation.3 (R., p.62.) 
At sentencing, the State asked to be released from the plea agreement as 
Mr. Farr had been charged with violating the no contact order prior to his sentencing 
hearing. (2/17/12 Tr., p.5, Ls.18-25.) Defense counsel did not object and the district 
2 A substance abuse evaluation was ordered for the sentencing in a misdemeanor 
excessive DUI and misdemeanor injury to child case, Kootenai County case number CR 
2010-24906, that was set to be sentenced at the same hearing. (12/21/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.4 
- p.6, L.24; R., pp.64-65.) Defense counsel suggested that the substance abuse 
evaluation could be used at the sentencing for both the misdemeanor and felony 
charges. (12/21/11 Tr., p.13, Ls.10-13.) 
3 A domestic violence evaluation was ordered, but it was determined that Mr. Farr would 
get a domestic violence and substance abuse evaluation combined. (12/21/11 
Tr., p.13, Ls.4-16.) The domestic violence evaluation was not part of the record on 
appeal and it does not appear that the district court received or considered the 
evaluation. 
2 
court imposed upon Mr. Farr a sentence of eight years, with three years fixed. (2/17/12 
Tr., p.12, Ls.2-6; R., pp.66-68.) The district court retained jurisdiction over Mr. Farr's 
case. (2/17/12 Tr., p.12, L.6; R., pp.66-70.) 
During the period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Farr attended his programs and 
completed his assignments; however, while on the rider, he attempted numerous times 
to contact his children by calling his wife's cell phone, and his wife was a person 
protected from being contacted by Mr. Farr through a no contact order. (PSI, p.54; 
R., pp.75-77.) Therefore the Idaho Department of Correction removed Mr. Farr from the 
CAPP facility and recommended that Mr. Farr's retained jurisdiction be relinquished. 
(PSI, pp.53-54; R., p.75.) The district court held a review hearing so that Mr. Farr could 
present evidence and testimony to aid the district court in determining whether Mr. Farr 
violated the conditions of his retained jurisdiction. (See generally 10/5/12 Tr.; R., pp.83-
87.) At his rider review hearing, Mr. Farr's wife and two corrections officers testified. 
(See generally 7/24/12 Tr.) In spite of Mr. Farr's performance on his rider,4 the district 
court decided to relinquish jurisdiction. (10/5/12 Tr., p.46, Ls.16-17; R., pp.91-92.) 
Mr. Farr then filed a timely I.C.R. 35 Motion for Reduction of Sentence 
(hereinafter, Rule 35). (Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence Pursuant to I.C.R. 35.5) 
The district court held a hearing, during which Mr. Farr testified via telephone and asked 
either to be placed on probation or to serve another period of retained jurisdiction so he 
could continue receiving programming. (2/28/13 Tr., p.4, L.17- p.14, L.17.) The district 
4 Mr. Farr was completing his assignments and appeared to be well on his way to 
completing a successful rider. (PSI, p.54.) 
5 Attached to the Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and 
Statement in Support Thereof, filed February 26, 2013. 
3 
court denied Mr. Farr's Rule 35 motion. (Order, p.1.6) Mr. Farr appeals from the district 
court's order relinquishing jurisdiction and the district court's order denying his I.C.R. 35 
motion. (R., pp.94-96.) 
6 Attached to the Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and 
Statement in Support Thereof, filed February 26, 2013. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court act in manifest disregard for the pertinent provisions of 
I.C.R. 32 and the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522, when it failed to sua sponte 
order a mental health evaluation of Mr. Farr prior to sentencing? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished its retained 
jurisdiction over Mr. Farr? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Farr's Idaho Criminal 




The District Court Acted In Manifest Disregard Of I.C.R. 32 And I.C. § 19-2522. When It 
Failed To Sua Sponte Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of Mr. Farr Prior To 
Sentencing 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Farr suffers from serious mental health problems, which appear to have been 
undiagnosed and untreated. His mental health issues were so apparent that the PSI 
investigator, as well as the substance abuse evaluator, both recommended that Mr. Farr 
receive a mental health evaluation. Further, Mr. Farr's wife, the victim in this offense, 
also asked that Mr. Farr receive mental health treatment. Despite these clear 
indications that Mr. Farr's mental health was at issue, the district court only ordered 
substance abuse and domestic battery evaluations; 7 it failed to order a mental health 
evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522. 
At sentencing, defense counsel pointed out that the victim in the case, Mr. Farr's 
wife, ultimately wanted Mr. Farr to receive mental health treatment. (2/17/12 Tr., p.8, 
Ls.5-7; PSI, p.5.) Further, defense counsel also noted that Mr. Farr has asked for 
mental health treatment during his interview with the presentence investigator. (2/17 /12 
Tr., p.8, Ls.7-10; PSI, p.16.) In fact, defense counsel asked that Mr. Farr be placed on 
probation and as a condition of probation be required to apply to mental health court or 
drug court. (2/17/12 Tr., p.9, Ls.4-8.) However, the district court failed to consider the 
facts of Mr. Farr's crime or the requests for mental health treatment by: the victim, 
Mr. Farr, defense counsel, the presentence investigator, and the substance abuse 
6 
evaluator. The district court did not order a mental health evaluation, and made no 
mention of Mr. Farr's mental health before it sentenced Mr. Farr. 
Thus, the extent of Mr. Farr's mental health condition and the role it should play 
in fashioning Mr. Farr's sentence was never fully explored in a mental health evaluation. 
Accordingly, the district court manifestly disregarded the relevant portions of I.C.R. 32 
and I.C. § 19-2522 when it failed to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to 
1.C. § 19-2522. 
B. The District Court Acted In Manifest Disregard Of I.C.R. 32 And I.C. § 19-2522, 
When It Failed To Sua Sponte Order A Mental Health Evaluation Of Mr. Farr 
Prior To Sentencing 
"After the determination of guilt it is essential that the court receive adequate 
information about the defendant before handing down the sentence. Individualizing 
sentences is impossible without such information." State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 
878 (Ct. App. 1994) (internal citations omitted). Before imposing a sentence, the court 
may appoint a psychologist to examine and report on the mental condition of the 
defendant. See I.C. § 19-2522; I.C.R. 32(d); McFarland, 125 Idaho 878-79. The legal 
standards governing the district court's decision whether to order a psychological 
evaluation and report are contained in I.C. §19-2522: 
(1) If there is reason to believe the mental condition of the defendant will 
be a significant factor at sentencing and for good cause shown, the court 
shall appoint at least one (1) psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to 
examine and report upon the mental condition of the defendant. 
(3) The report of the examination shall include the following: 
(a) A description of the nature of the examination; 
7 Although a domestic violence evaluation was ordered, and Mr. Farr was interviewed 
on February 2, 2012, no report was received by the presentence investigator or the 
court. (PSI, pp.16-17.) 
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(b) A diagnosis, evaluation or prognosis of the mental condition of 
the defendant; 
(c) An analysis of the degree of the defendant's illness or defect 
and level of functional impairment; 
(d) A consideration of whether treatment is available for the 
defendant's mental condition; 
(e) An analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or 
nontreatment; 
(f) A consideration of the risk of danger which the defendant may 
create for the public if at large. 
"The requirements of I.C. § 19-2522 are complimented by Idaho Criminal Rule 
32 which specifies the elements to be included in the presentence report. These 
elements include information on the health of the defendant where relevant to the 
sentencing decision, I.C.R. 32(b)(8), and, where appropriate, the presentence 
investigator's analysis and recommendation regarding a psychological examination, 
I.C.R. 32(b)(10)." State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 822 (2010). 
The decision whether to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-
2522 is discretionary with the district court. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 144 Idaho 408, 
409 (Ct. App. 2007). However, as with any exercise of discretion, the district court's 
determination must be consistent with applicable legal standards. State v. Coonts, 137 
Idaho 150, 152 (Ct. App. 2002). "The legal standards governing the court's decision 
whether to order a psychological evaluation and report are contained in I.C. § 19-2522." 
Collins, 144 Idaho at 409. Idaho Code § 19-2522 provides that a mental health 
evaluation is mandatory, rather than discretionary, if there is reason to believe that the 
mental condition of the defendant will be a significant factor at sentencing and for good 
cause shown. Coonts, 137 Idaho at 152; State v. McFarland, 125 Idaho 876, 879 
(Ct. App. 1994). A reviewing court will uphold the failure of the district court to order a 
8 
mental health evaluation if the record supports the finding that there was no reason to 
believe that the defendant's mental condition would be a significant factor at sentencing 
or if the information already before the district court meets the requirements of I.C. § 19-
2522. State v. Craner, 137 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 2002). "Where a defendant did not 
request a psychological evaluation or object to the absence of such an evaluation in the 
PSI, the defendant must demonstrate that by failing to order such an evaluation the 
sentencing court manifestly disregarded the provisions of I.C.R. 32." Jockumsen, 148, 
Idaho at 822 (citations omitted). 
In this case, the record is replete with indications that Mr. Farr suffered from 
severe mental health issues. Mr. Farr's uncharacteristic actions on the morning of the 
incident and the impressions of the police officers who arrested him demonstrate that 
Mr. Farr may have undiagnosed mental health issues. That morning, Mr. Farr appeared 
disoriented and officers, after observing his condition, asked him if he needed medical 
attention. (PSI, p.4.) Further, Mr. Farr asked for mental health treatment when 
interviewed by his presentencing investigator. (PSI, p.16.) Mr. Farr, when asked about 
his mental health by the presentence investigator, said that he had not had any 
psychological counseling but he would welcome it to help him understand "why [his] 
mood swings." (PSI, p.16.) The presentence investigator concluded: 
Based on the Defendant's description of his having extreme mood swings, 
paranoia, irrational fears, an obsessive need to control his environment, 
and his recent violent actions towards his wife, it appears he would benefit 
from a Mental Health (Psychological) Evaluation. 
(PSI, p.17.) She went on to say that Mr. Farr was in need of long-term intensive 
inpatient treatment to address his mental health and substance abuse issues. (PSI, 
p.20.) 
9 
Additionally, the substance abuse evaluator concluded that Mr. Farr suffered 
from serious mental health issues. The substance abuse evaluator noted that Mr. Farr 
"appears to be struggling with mental health symptoms needing to be processed, 
examined, and monitored by a mental health specialist." (PSI, p.50.) The substance 
abuse evaluator recommended that Mr. Farr obtain intensive outpatient treatment to 
allow him the opportunity to address his mental health issues under the direct 
supervision of professional staff members. (PSI, p.50.) 
Mr. Farr's wife stated that Mr. Farr had mental health issues as a result of his 
service in the Army Special Forces.8 (PSI, p.3.) She stated that Mr. Farr needs mental 
health counseling. (PSI, p.5.) She reported that Mr. Farr's extreme mood swings and 
irrational behavior were escalating. (PSI, pp.5-6.) She said that Mr. Farr would sink 
into an angry depression and would become extremely paranoid that Ms. Farr might 
cheat on him. (PSI, p.5.) Mr. Farr would then return to "normal" and say that he knew 
Ms. Farr would never cheat on him. (PSI, p.5.) Ms. Farr said that Mr. Farr has a severe 
drinking problem and experiences extreme mood swings. (PSI, p.5.) The morning of 
the incident, Mr. Farr began saying things that did not make any sense.9 (PSI, p.5.) 
Further, Ms. Farr also stated that Mr. Farr frequently had nightmares in which he would 
summersault into a standing position with a machine gun stance, would speak in a 
foreign language, and act like he was shooting people in the jungle. (PSI, p.14.) 
8 Mr. Farr admitted that he has never been in the Special Forces, although his father 
was in the military. (PSI, p.14.) Mr. Farr also served as a volunteer fire fighter and told 
the presentence investigator that he "witnessed horrific things happening to people in 
fires or other emergencies" while working in that capacity. (PSI, p.20.) 
9 Mr. Farr later told the presentence investigator that it was important "to be me again." 
(PSI, p.19.) 
10 
Ms. Farr told police that she thinks something is wrong with Mr. Farr and that he needs 
help. (PSI, p.26.) 
However, Mr. Farr never received the comprehensive mental health evaluation 
which was deemed necessary by the PSI investigator and the substance abuse 
evaluator, and requested by the victim of Mr. Farr's crime. 
Mr. Farr's mental health should have been a significant mitigating factor at 
sentencing, but the district court may have viewed Mr. Farr's actions attributable to his 
mental health condition as an aggravating factor instead. At sentencing, the district 
court stated: "I find the facts to be shocking. They're alarming." (12/17/12 Tr., p.11, 
L.19.) There never was an official diagnosis that Mr. Farr suffered from a mental health 
condition. However, Mr. Farr's mental health issues were raised both prior to, and 
during, sentencing, and the district court relied on Mr. Farr's actions on the morning of 
the incident when fashioning his sentence. 
The limited information before the district court at sentencing does not function 
as an adequate substitute for an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation. As stated above, the 
substance abuse evaluation stated that Mr. Farr "appears to be struggling with mental 
health symptoms needing to be processed, examined, and monitored by a mental 
health specialist." (PSI, p.50.) The substance abuse evaluator recommended that 
Mr. Farr obtain intensive outpatient treatment to allow him the opportunity to remain 
clean and sober while addressing his mental health issues under the direct supervision 
of professional staff members. (PSI, p.50.) Although the substance abuse evaluator 
noted that it would be important to obtain Mr. Farr's mental health records to determine 
the extent of his mental health issues and his needs for treatment, it does not appear 
that the substance abuse evaluator ever requested or received Mr. Farr's records. (PSI, 
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p.43.) Further, the substance abuse evaluator held a a Master's in Social Work degree, 
and she was not a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist, as required by I.C. § 19-2522. 
Therefore, there never was a mental health evaluation which diagnosed the extent of 
Mr. Farr's mental illness or complied with the requirements of I.C. § 19-2522. Although 
the substance abuse evaluation mentioned Mr. Farr's mental health, it did not inform the 
court on all of the I.C. § 19-2522 factors, such as consideration of whether treatment is 
available for a defendant's mental condition, the relative risks and benefits of treatment 
or nontreatment, and the risk of danger that the defendant presents to the public. 
One of the problems with the lack of a mental health evaluation is that the 
sentence is not properly reflective of potential mitigating evidence. Had Mr. Farr 
received a mental health evaluation, treatment could have been geared toward treating 
both his mental health and his substance abuse. The district court noted that it was 
sentencing Mr. Farr to prison in order to rehabilitate him as well as to protect the public. 
(12/17/12 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-4.) Yet, the district court had no basis on which to determine 
whether the acts that resulted in Mr. Farr's criminal charge were attributable to mental 
health condition, substance abuse problems, or anger issues, and whether Mr. Farr 
could successfully be rehabilitated without treating his mental health condition. This is 
the very scenario I.C. § 19-2522 was created to prevent. In fact, I.C. § 19-2522(3)(d) 
requires a mental health report to include "[a] consideration of whether treatment is 
available for the defendant's mental condition, " and I.C. § 19-2522(3)(e) requires "[a]n 
analysis of the relative risks and benefits of treatment or nontreatment." In this case 
none of this information was before the district court at sentencing. Therefore, the 
district court should have ordered a full I. C. § 19-2522 mental health evaluation. 
12 
In sum, the district court was provided with both a PSI and a substance abuse 
evaluation that put the court on notice that trained professionals believed that Mr. Farr 
might suffer from a mental health condition. Further, both statements from the victim in 
this case and Mr. Farr himself indicated that Mr. Farr's mental health was deteriorating 
and, thus, could have been the reason for the incident. Additionally, Mr. Farr's odd 
behavior the morning of the incident should have provided additional impetus for the 
district court to order a mental health evaluation. However, no mental health evaluation 
was ever ordered. 
At sentencing, the district court solely focused on the acts constituting the crime 
and did not address Mr. Farr's possible mental illness when it sentenced him to a period 
of retained jurisdiction. Because, Mr. Farr's undiagnosed mental illness may have been 
a significant factor in the commission of the crime and at sentencing, and since there 
was never a I.C. § 19-2522 mental health evaluation ordered, the district court acted in 
manifest disregard of I.C.R. 32, which requires the elements of I.C. § 19-2522 be 
included in the PSI when a defendant's mental health is a significant factor at 
sentencing, and, thus, this case should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing in 
which a mental health evaluation is ordered. 
II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction Over 
Mr. Farr Without Reducing His Sentence 
Before the district court relinquishes jurisdiction over a defendant, it must 
evaluate whether probation would be appropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. State v. 
Statton, 136 Idaho 135, 137 (2001 ). "The decision to place a defendant on probation or 
whether, instead, to relinquish jurisdiction over the defendant is a matter within the 
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sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an 
abuse of that discretion." State v. Schultz, 149 Idaho 285, 288-289 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Upon review of a sentence following a period of retained jurisdiction, this Court reviews 
the entire record, encompassing events both before and after the original judgment. Id. 
at 289. 
Mr. Farr contends the district court abused its discretion in relinquishing 
jurisdiction without reducing his sentence in light of his limited success on the retained 
jurisdiction program, his recognition of a problem, and his rehabilitative potential. 
Mr. Farr recognizes that his period of retained jurisdiction was not as successful 
as desired. However, he did have some limited successes during the period of retained 
jurisdiction. There were several positive notes in his file indicating that Mr. Farr was 
performing quite well on the rider, prior to the discovery that Mr. Farr was attempting to 
contact a person protected by a no contact order. Mr. Farr was compliant and 
participative during his time on the retained jurisdiction. (R., p.54.) The CAPP Rider 
Review and Recommendations Form indicated that "[h]e completed exercises on time 
and took part in group discussions without needing to be prompted." (R., p.54.) 
However, because Mr. Farr attempted to contact his children by calling his wife's 
phone, the Idaho Department of Correction clinical team recommended that the district 
court relinquish its jurisdiction over Mr. Farr. (10/5/12 Tr., p.40, Ls.4-10; R., pp.53-55.) 
Notably, once Mr. Farr was ordered to stop calling his wife's phone, he ceased calling 
immediately. (R., p.54; 10/5/12 Tr., p.31, Ls.3-6, p.40, Ls.13-18.) 
In light of all of the mitigating evidence that was presented to the district court 
that demonstrates Mr. Farr's significant rehabilitative potential, as well as his limited 
successes while on his rider, the district court abused its discretion when it failed to sua 
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sponte reduce Mr. Farr's sentence of eight years, with three years fixed, upon 
relinquishing jurisdiction over his case. 
111. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Farr's Rule 35 Motion For A 
Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of The New Information Presented At The Rule 35 
Hearing 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which 
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the 
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable." Id. "If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, 
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional 
information presented with the motion for reduction. Id. 
Mr. Farr asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the mitigating 
factors that exist in his case. From the outset, one of the most striking facts regarding 
Mr. Farr is his status as a first time felony offender at the time of the alleged offense -
he had no prior felony convictions, but his wife felt that his behavior had been 
escalating. (PSI, pp.3, 5-6.) Further, Mr. Farr had just gotten out of a rehabilitation 
facility for his substance abuse issues. (PSI, p.1.) He knew that he had a problem 
abusing alcohol and he was trying to get help for it. This absence of a lengthy criminal 
history, coupled with Mr. Farr's motivation for treatment at the time of the alleged 
offense, shows that Mr. Farr has great potential for rehabilitation in the future. 
Although Mr. Farr had not been diagnosed with a mental health condition, the 
facts of this case and subsequent evaluations show that Mr. Farr was experiencing 
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extreme mood swings, paranoia, irrational fears, and an obsessive need to control his 
environment; thus it appears that Mr. Farr is suffering from serious underlying mental 
health conditions. (PSI, p.17.) The Idaho Supreme Court has recently recognized that 
Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness 
as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that substance abuse should be considered 
as a mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. 
Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence 
based on Nice's lack of prior record and the fact that "the trial court did not give proper 
consideration of the defendant's alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing 
defendant to commit the crime and the suggested alternatives for treating the problem." 
Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that ingestion of drugs and 
alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate criminality of conduct, could be a 
mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414 (1981). The majority of 
Mr. Farr's criminal activity has been while under the influence of alcohol. (PSI, pp.7-8.) 
Mr. Farr first used alcohol when he was seventeen years old, but rarely drank until 
2008, at which time he was no longer working and began drinking heavily to combat his 
feelings of failure stemming from being unemployed. (PSI, p.17.) Mr. Farr realizes that 
he has a problem with alcohol and wants to stop drinking. (PSI, p.17.) In fact, Mr. Farr 
had recently returned from a voluntary 40-day stay in a substance abuse/anger 
management rehabilitation facility in Florida prior to this incident. (PSI, pp.3, 17.) 
Furthermore, this is Mr. Farr's first felony offense. (PSI, p.8.) The Idaho 
Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should be accorded more lenient 
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treatment than the habitual criminal." State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (1998); see 
also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). 
The defendant in Hoskins pied guilty to two counts of drawing a check without 
funds. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673. In Nice, the defendant pied guilty to the charge of 
lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor. Nice, 103 Idaho at 90. In both Hoskins and 
Nice, the court considered, among other important factors, that the defendants had no 
prior felony convictions. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673; Nice, 103 Idaho at 90. The 
Hoskins Court ultimately found that based upon the nature of the offense and the 
absence of any prior serious criminal record, the district court abused its discretion in 
imposing the sentence. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 675. 
Additionally, Mr. Farr has expressed his remorse for committing the instant 
offense. Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant expresses 
remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). In State v. 
Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals reduced the sentence imposed "[i]n light of Alberts' 
expression of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to 
accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character." Id. 121 Idaho at 204. 
See also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing sentence of first time 
offender who accepted responsibility for his acts and had the support of his family in his 
rehabilitation efforts); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988) 
(reducing sentence of first time offender who accepted responsibility, expressed 
remorse, and had been of good character before the offense at issue) reversed on other 
grounds, State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295 (1990). 
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Mr. Farr expressed considerable remorse to the court for committing the instant 
offense: 
I need some help and I really am sorry for hurting my wife. She's been 
through enough. I think it's time I just, I guess in layman's terms, pay the 
piper and get the help. 
I want to be the person I used to be again. And I don't want to see my 
wife go through any more pain than I've already caused, whatsoever. And 
if there's any questions on the reports, my wife has never been a liar, 
ever, so whatever she said in there is true." 
(2/16/12 Tr., p.9, L.23-p.10, L.14.) 
Mr. Farr asserts that had the district court properly considered his remorse, 
desire for treatment, and mental health issues, it would have reduced his sentence 
pursuant to his Rule 35 motion. He further asserts that his sentence should have been 
reduced in light of the new information submitted in conjunction with his Rule 35 motion. 
Mr. Farr asserts that the district court's denial of his motion for a sentence modification 
represents an abuse of discretion. 
In support of his motion for a sentence reduction, Mr. Farr testified at the Rule 35 
hearing regarding his time in custody. (2/8/13 Tr., p.6, L.7 - p.11, L.25.) Mr. Farr has 
benefitted from completing both a Moral Reconation Therapy (MRT) program and an 
anger management program since he was sentenced. (2/8/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.17-19, p.7, 
Ls.7-15.) Mr. Farr stated that the MRT program changed his way of thinking and he 
feels considerable remorse for his selfish behaviors. (2/8/13 Tr., p.7, Ls.17-20.) 
Mr. Farr informed the district court that he is using the skills and information obtained 
during his programming; he has learned how to vent his anger and make healthy 
choices. (2/8/13 Tr., p.7, L.22 - p.8, L.4.) This demonstrates that Mr. Farr is actively 
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putting to use the information he learned from the prison programming. He is trying to 
use this information to better himself. 
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district 
court at the time of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in failing 
to reduce Mr. Farr's sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Farr respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district court 
for a new sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his 
sentence as it deems appropriate. Mr. Farr requests that the order denying his Rule 35 
motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 6th day of June, 2013. 
SALLY J. COOLEY 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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